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Abstract. With the increasing exposure of critical infrastructures to ex-
ternal factors, critical infrastructure protection gained attention within
security research. To develop protection methods the effect of external
factors on critical infrastructures has to be known. In this paper we
present an event-based, dynamic modeling approach using power flow
analysis and network flow analysis to simulate the effect on the critical in-
frastructure with object-based programming. The highly interconnected
cyber-physical system is defined as a two-layered system with separated
cyber and physical properties. Network stability and cyber infection sta-
tus is checked with two control feedback loops to maintain grid stability
and to observe infection status. Therefore with given object load pow-
ers and network interconnections the working capability of infrastructure
parts can be predicted for various scenarios.
1 Introduction
Due to an increasing number of cyber-attacks and damage related to them [1],
cyber-security gained a lot of attention not only in the media, but also from
governmental side. The main interest from governmental side is critical infras-
tructure protection (CIP) [2,3]. Nowadays critical infrastructures (CIs) have to
be considered as cyber-physical-systems (CPS) i. e. their operability depends
on information and communication technology (ICT) and physical properties
such as power supplies. Control systems build the interface between the physical
and cyber level and are therefore an excellent point to attack a CPS. Cyber at-
tacks on these control systems occurred in many different types of CIs e.g. water
services [4], nuclear power plants [5], or electricity distribution stations [6]. Inci-
dents are not always caused by human attacks. Especially the CI power supply
is vulnerable to environmental hazard (falling trees, geomagnetic storms etc.)
or even human failures [7]. To improve the resilience and preparedness of CIs
we have to understand the impact of external factors on the system. Modeling
and simulation approaches are powerful tools to gain knowledge about complex
systems and help to identify vulnerable points within the system. This is one
of the most important parts within risk management and a necessary step to
develop emergency plans in case of successful cyber attacks. Therefore, a time
dependent operability check for network components is needed from the physical
as well as the ICT side.
2 Cyber-Physical System Simulation
We use a two-level network system for our description of the cyber-physical
system. The first one describes physical and the second one ICT properties.
In addition lists with all directly connected objects are assigned to each single
object for both levels. Due to power line communication physically connected
objects are also considered to be connected on ICT level. To check operability
at each timesteps we use two control feedback loops. The first one checks wether
voltage and frequency are within a tolerance interval that enables operability and
the second one is the status of software infection of the object. The input for
this feedback loops is calculated via a dynamical load flow analysis and network
infection flow.
2.1 Load Flow Dynamics
The principle of static load flow analysis is a commonly used method to deter-
mine the voltages and phases within power distribution systems at given load
powers [8] via solving a system of non-linear equations with iterative methods.
As load power conditions at object i vary over time we introduce time dependent
apparent power Si(tj) as a dynamic boundary condition. Repeating the load flow
analysis at several time steps leads to a time-series for voltage magnitude Ui(tj)
and phase φi(ti). The frequency can be obtained by the change of phase with
time (1). The timestep ∆t to resolve fmax is limited by the Nyquist-Shannon
sampling theorem via ∆tmax = 12f max .
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Under the constraints that the voltage magnitudes Ui(tj) and frequency fi(tj)
determined for object i at time tj is within an a priori defined tolerance inter-
val and that the source is able to deliver the demanded power, the operability
of object i on physical side is guaranteed. If the grid is not stable, load shed-
ding schemes are used to balance demanded and supplied power.. In addition
blackouts can be simulated by directly setting object working status to false.
2.2 Network Infection Flow
We represent the ICT network level as an undirected, weighted graph. This
weights are introduced to combine all factors affecting propagation time like the
operating system, computer architecture, data transfer rate, type of connection,
used protocols and encryptions or security precautions into one macroscopic
measure (in seconds) being a weighting parameter wij for the edge between
objects i and j. If objects i and j are not connected wij is set to infinity. From
there on Dijkstra algorithm is applied to determine the shortest path from the
intrusion point of the network, which is defined within the cyber attack event.
This pathlength sets the time ti,inf for an infection of object i. The second control
loop checks whether the for the object indispensable applications are affected or
not. This is done via a simple comparison of listed properties of the object and
the defined event. If the software is aﬄicted, the objects functionability is set to
false.
3 Conclusions
A new simulation approach for CPS was presented that is based on a two-
layered network approach, dividing physical from software properties. The static
load flow analysis, know from electrical engineering, was enhanced to a time-
dependent network stability control method driven by dynamic boundary con-
ditions. Occuring events may trigger (partial-)blackouts or the intrusion of ma-
licious software. The propagation time of the infection within the network is
calculated via solving the shortest graph problem in an undirected graph with
weighted edges.
Though, this approach needs a lot of information about the network struc-
ture, the consideration of expert knowledge is possible. Moreover, even in more
modern CIs the data needed for data-driven machine learning approaches [9] is
not available. As the simulation approach can be adapted to other CIs, the appli-
cation within the field of CIP might be very diverse. However, a lot of work has
to be done, while connecting the operability of single objects or object groups
with CI specific processes.
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